

CHRYSIPPUS ON ACHILLES: THE EVIDENCE OF GALEN *DE PLACITIS HIPPOCRATIS ET PLATONIS* 4.6–7*

Homer's Achilles, a man of emotional extremes, is a problematic figure for ancient ethical theorists. In Plato's *Republic* Socrates excoriates Homer for presenting a hero driven by grief and anger.¹ Iliadic Achilles is synonymous with ὀργή in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1378b31–5), and he surely lies behind the philosopher's portrayal of those endowed with strong spirit (θυμός) who 'love and hate beyond measure' (*Pol.* 1328a16). We may expect, therefore, that the Stoic Chrysippus, whose virtuous ideal requires extirpation of the πάθη, those excessive and irrational affections of soul, would treat Achilles as a purely negative *exemplum*, just as he treats Euripides' Medea.² Indeed it is Odysseus rather than Achilles who provides the Stoics with a Homeric approximation of virtuous conduct.³ However, testimony from Galen *PHP* (*De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*) 4 shows that Chrysippus treats Achilles not only as a negative *exemplum* of vicious passions, but also in a more positive light, as someone recovering from passion and acting as therapist for another, namely Priam, in *Iliad* 24. Through Chrysippus' use and discussion of *Iliad* 24 Achilles is rehabilitated as a model of the healing potential of reason. Traces of this Stoic reading can be found in the Homeric scholia, showing that Chrysippus' views are part of a vibrant ancient tradition of Homeric reception and interpretation.

Galen's own agenda in quoting Chrysippus at *PHP* 4.6.40–1 and 4.7.24–8 is entirely polemical. Chrysippus' orthodox Stoic theory is that the passions are movements of a single, unified psychic entity (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), which is responsible for all cognition and affection. He argues that the passions are, or at least have as sufficient conditions, irrational, false judgements.⁴ Galen argues instead for the view of Plato (which he takes to be shared by Posidonius) that the soul is divided into discrete rational and irrational parts, and that the latter are causally responsible for

* I would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments.

¹ Plato, *Republic* 386b, 388a, 391a–c, cf. 605d. On Plato's use of Achilles, see A. Hobbs, *Plato and the Hero. Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good* (Cambridge, 2000), chapters 6–8. Hobbs notes (238) that Achilles is pointedly excluded from the Myth of Er at the end of the *Republic*.

² Chrysippus' discussion of lines from Euripides *Medea* is quoted at length by Galen (*PHP* 4.2.14–18, 24, 27). As C. Gill comments, it was probably the combination in Euripides' lines of Medea's 'perverse disobedience of reason combined with a sense of the lack of psychological control that made this example of interest to Chrysippus' ('Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?', *Phronesis* 28 (1983), 136–49, at 144).

³ See Seneca *Dial.* 2.2; Epictetus *Encheiridion* 2.24.13, 26.31; Maximus of Tyre *Dissert.* 15.6, 38.7; and the discussion of F. Buffière, *Les Mythes d'Homère et la Pensée Grecque* (Paris, 1956), 374–7.

⁴ Thus on the orthodox Stoic theory psychic conflict is simply a vacillation between judgements, or 'the turning of a single rational capacity in both directions; this escapes our notice because of the swiftness of the shift' (Plutarch, *Mor.* 446F–447A = *SVF* 3.459). On the sources and modern controversies concerning the old Stoic theory of emotions, see T. Brennan, 'The old Stoic theory of emotions' in J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen (edd.), *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Amsterdam, 1998), 21–70.

the *πάθη* which oppose reason's judgements. Much scholarly ink has been and continues to be spilled concerning what, at a deep level, the philosophically significant differences between the two theories actually are.⁵ However, irrespective of these debates, Galen's quotations of Chrysippus on Achilles in *Iliad* 24 are significant in that they reveal how Chrysippus appropriated and validated the hero who appears most problematic for Stoic theory.

At *PHP* 4.6.40–1 (= *SVF* 3.478, part), Galen reports Chrysippus' quotation of *Iliad* 24.549–51:⁶

Παρατίθεται δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως πρὸς τὸν Πρίαμον εἰρημένα·

*ἄνσχεο μὴδ' ἄλιστατον ὁδύρεο σὸν κατὰ θυμόν·
οὐ γάρ τι πρήξεις ἀκα[σ]χήμενος υἱὸς ἑῷος
οὐδέ μιν ἀνστήσεις· πρὶν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθησθα.*

Ταῦτα μὲν φησι λέγειν αὐτὸν παρ' αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενον – οὕτω γὰρ ἔγραψεν αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν – ἐξίστασθαι δ' οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων κρίσεων ἐν τοῖς συμπίπτουσι καὶ μὴ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ νικώμενον ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν.

He (Chrysippus) also cites Achilles' words to Priam:

'Endure and do not let the grief in your spirit be unbendable. You will accomplish nothing by mourning for your son. You will not bring him back; sooner you will suffer even another bad thing.'

He (Chrysippus) says that Achilles says these things 'speaking in his right mind'⁷ – these are the very words he wrote – but that Achilles often abandons these same judgements in times of crisis, and does not rule himself when conquered by his passions.

Galen's point here is his customary one, namely that Chrysippus contradicts himself, in that he endorses a cognitive theory of passion, but writes as if passion overcomes judgement. But most interesting here is the fact that, according to Chrysippus, Achilles' return to rationality is manifest in his therapeutic and consoling advice to the Trojan king. In fact, Achilles' advice finds an analogue in a later Stoic text, Seneca's *consolatio* to the grieving Lucilius in *Ep.* 63. Seneca, like Achilles when

⁵ T. Tieleman has made much headway in reconstructing Chrysippus' original view on the basis of Galen's prejudiced and confused testimony (*Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul. Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis Books II–III* (Leiden, 1996), and *Chrysippus' On Affections. Reconstruction and Interpretation* (Leiden, 2003)). G.R. Carone ('Plato's Stoic view of motivation', in R. Salles [ed.], *Metaphysics, Soul and Ethics in Ancient Thought* [Oxford, 2005], 365–82) argues that for both the Stoics and Plato *all* motivating desires require evaluative attitudes, even those desires that Plato attributes in the *Republic* to the basest part of soul, the appetitive faculty (*contra* J. Cooper, 'Plato's theory of human motivation', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 1 [1984], 3–21). Gill ('Competing readings of Stoic emotions', in Salles [ed.], 445–70) argues that the debate between monistic and bi- or tripartite psychology, which is so important to Plutarch and Galen, was not a debate recognized by the early Stoics themselves, who likely saw themselves as articulating a view inspired by their philosophical predecessors, Plato and Aristotle, rather than as putting forward an alternative view. According to Gill, later Stoics such as Posidonius attempt to clarify the relationship between Stoic views and Platonic texts, and do not necessarily make Platonizing innovations to Stoic theory.

⁶ Here I use the text of P. De Lacy (ed.), *Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* (Berlin, 1981), vol. 1. Regrettably, the most recent edition of Chrysippus' fragments (R. Dufour [ed.], *L'Oeuvre Chrysippe. Textes Traduits et Commentés* [Paris, 2004]) omits the two passages of Galen (*PHP* 4.6.40–1, 7.24–8) which I discuss below. However, the two passages are included in M. Graver, *Cicero on the Emotions. Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4* (Chicago, 2002), Appendix C, 208–9.

⁷ As Tieleman, *Chrysippus' On Affections* (n. 5), 177, n. 129, notes, this expression is the 'opposite to that employed for people in a state of emotion' (see Galen *PHP* 4.6.24–5).

speaking with Priam, does not try to persuade Lucilius that the death of a loved one is not a bad thing, but rather that grief is fruitless (*Ep.* 63.7–12). Moreover, just as Achilles is recovering from Patroclus' death, so Seneca has recently suffered overwhelming grief after the death of Annaeus Serenus (*Ep.* 63.14–15).⁸ Seneca himself alludes at 63.2 to the *Iliad's* references to Niobe's mourning (*Iliad* 19.228, 24.601). Indeed this Iliadic allusion is rather conventional in *consolationes* both Stoic and non-Stoic, suggesting that Chrysippus and other Stoics draw upon common *topoi* in their writings on consolation, but employ those *topoi* in ways which suit their specific therapeutic purposes and philosophical doctrines.⁹

Chrysippus' discussion of Achilles in *Iliad* 24 and its Senecan analogue should remind us that the Stoics take human nature to be entirely social, and that absence of and recovery from passions do not entail a lack of compassion for others.¹⁰ In fact, according to Stoic theory, it is only when one is free from *πάθος* that one can treat others appropriately. In *Iliad* 24 Homer stresses the strangeness of the encounter between Achilles and Priam, two characters who have every reason to hate one another, by his emphasis on the 'wonder' that the two themselves and the onlookers experience.¹¹ But for the Stoics, while the encounter may be unusual, it also exemplifies in a concrete and dramatic way their view that the human community transcends both personal friendship and enmity, and conventional political boundaries. Achilles and Priam here enact the process of social *oikeiōsis* according to which, as the Stoics argued, we naturally and rationally extend concern to and / or identify with others, including those who seem foreign or alien (see Cicero *Fin.* 3.62–8; Hierocles in Stob. 4.671.7–673.11).¹²

⁸ This aspect of *Ep.* 63 has been stressed by M. Wilson, 'The subjugation of grief in Seneca's *Epistles*', in S.M. Braund and C. Gill (edd.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge, 1997), 48–67, at 49: 'If Seneca here must be likened to a physician, it is a physician himself severely affected by the same symptoms diagnosed in the patient'. The same could be said for Achilles addressing Priam.

⁹ Seneca *Ep.* 63.2: *duram tibi legem videor ponere, cum poetarum Graecorum maximus ius flendi dederit in unum dumtaxat diem, cum dixerit etiam Niobam de cibo cogitasse?* W. Summers (*Select Letters of Seneca* [London, 1940], 240) comments on this line: 'the argument from Niobe is as old as the fourth century, when the comic poet Timocles, dilating on the benefits which the audience derives from drama, says τέθνηκέ τῷ παῖς; ἡ Νιόβη κεκούφικε (Athenaeus 6.2)'. On the relationship between Stoic therapeutic consolations and other types of *consolatio* see R. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur* (Munich, 1958), 17–28. Graver (n. 6), 187–94, stresses the role of the Academic Crantor, as evidenced by ps.-Plutarch *Παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον* (Plutarch, *Mor.* 105c–d), in presenting a philosophical, Academic version of the consolation, to which the Stoics responded. However, since Crantor was a contemporary of Zeno, it is possible that Crantor's work *On Grief* was itself a response to the earliest Stoic ethical theory (see H. Mette, 'Zwei Akademiker Heute: Crantor und Arkesilaos', *Lustrum* 26 (1984), 7–94 at 33). At the very least, Crantor must have been responding to the Cynics.

¹⁰ This has been stressed recently by G. Reydam-Schils, *The Roman Stoics. Self, Responsibility, and Affection* (Chicago, 2005). See particularly pp. 115–42 on different Stoic strategies for relieving the grief of bereaved parents. Much, though not all, of Reydam-Schils's analysis is relevant to early Greek Stoicism in addition to the Roman imperial period, which is her specific concern.

¹¹ *Iliad* 24.483–4, 629, 631.

¹² I use the phrase 'extend concern to and / or identify with' in recognition of M.M. McCabe's worry ('Extend or identify: two Stoic accounts of altruism', in Salles (ed.) (n. 5), 412–44) that some Stoic sources, particularly Cicero *Fin.* 3.62–68, countenance two rather different models of *oikeiōsis* and do not satisfactorily distinguish between the two. The first model, suggested by Hierocles, is that we extend our self-concern ever outwards so that more and more people become

This humanitarian aspect of *Iliad* 24, which is in the context at once both striking and understandable, is noted by a scholiast, who comments on *Iliad* 24.515, 'it is strange that he (i.e. Achilles) leads the enemy by the hand, letting go his anger. He does this swiftly, remembering the old age of his father'.¹³ This aspect of the encounter has also been stressed by Zanker, who argues that Achilles' behaviour in the final book 'transcends the institutionalized reciprocity which the epic presents as the dominant ethical orientation of the heroic society which it depicts'.¹⁴ Coming from a very different perspective, Graziosi and Haubold argue that in *Iliad* 24 Achilles begins to identify less with the gods and, as exemplified by the encounter with Priam, more with other mortals, who share with him the same kind of fate and familial ties.¹⁵

Chrysippus' focus, however, is uniquely Stoic in that he is interested not in the fact that Achilles and Priam fill the tent with the sound of their shared weeping (*Iliad* 24.512), but rather in the subsequent train of events, when Achilles has recovered from grief and encourages Priam to do the same. The importance of this scene for Chrysippus is emphasized in a second passage from his *On the Passions*, quoted by Galen (*PHP* 4.7.24–8 = *SVF* 3.467, part), and transmitted via Posidonius:

... αὐτός τε δείκνυσιν ὡς ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας γίνεται τὰ πάθη καὶ διὰ τίνα τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ καθίσταται, κἂν αἱ δόξαι τε καὶ αἱ κρίσεις ἐτι μένωσι τοῦ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς ἢ γεγονέναι. Προσchrῆται δ' εἰς τοῦτο μάρτυρι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον Περὶ τῶν παθῶν ὡδέ πως γράφοντι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς λύπης καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐμπλησθέντες τινὲς ὁμοίως φαίνονται ἀφίστασθαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀχιλλέως ταῦτα λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς πενθούντος τὸν Πάτροκλον·

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ κλαίων τε κυλινδόμενός τ' ἐκορέσθη,
καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ πραπίδων ἦλθ' ἥμερος ἡδ' ἀπὸ γυνών,¹⁶ (*Iliad* 24.513–14)

ἐπὶ τὸ παρακαλεῖν ὤρμησε τὸν Πρίαμον τὴν τῆς λύπης ἀλογίαν αὐτῷ παριστάς. εἴτ' ἐφέξῃς ἐπιφέρει καὶ ταῦτα· καθ' ὃν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἀπελπίσαι τις οὕτως τῶν πραγμάτων ἐγχρονοζομένων καὶ τῆς παθητικῆς φλεγμονῆς ἀνιεμένης τὸν λόγον παρεισδύμενον καὶ οἰοεὶ χώραν λαμβάνοντα παριστάναι τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀλογίαν.

included in our self-interest. The second, which McCabe attributes to Chrysippus, is that we naturally identify with others as similar to ourselves. Chrysippus' use of the *Iliad* 24 material suggests that he reads Achilles as identifying with Priam rather than extending his self-interest to include the interests of Priam. However, note that this identification is grounded, in the text of *Iliad* 24, in an extended rather than atomized conception of self-interest on the part of both Achilles and Priam. Priam is effective in appeasing Achilles and enlisting his empathy because he presents himself in a role analogous to that of Achilles' father, Peleus (*Iliad* 24.486–506). For other readings of Stoic social *oikeiōsis* see T. Engberg-Perdersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis. Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy* (Aarhus, 1990); G. Reydam-Schils, 'Human bonding and *oikeiosis* in Roman Stoicism', *OSAP* 22 (Summer 2002), 222–51; K. Algra 'The mechanism of social appropriation and its role in Hellenistic ethics', *OSAP* 25 (Winter 2003), 265–97.

¹³ παράδοξον τὸ τὸν ἐχθρὸν χειραγωγεῖν τὸν θυμὸν ἀνέντα. τάχα οὖν τοῦτο ποιεῖ τοῦ γήρως τοῦ πατρὸς μνησθεῖς (b scholia in H. Erbse [ed.], *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, vol. 5 [Berlin, 1977], 605).

¹⁴ G. Zanker, 'Beyond reciprocity: the Akhilleus-Priam scene in *Iliad* 24', in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite and R. Seaford (edd.), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1998), 73–92, at 73. See also G. Zanker, *The Heart of Achilles. Characterization and Personal Ethics in the Iliad* (Michigan, 1994), 127–54.

¹⁵ B. Graziosi and J. Haubold, *Homer: the Resonance of Epic* (London, 2005), chapter 5. Graziosi's and Haubold's view of *Iliad* 24 is part of a broader claim about the structure of Homeric epic. They show how Achilles in the *Iliad* and Odysseus in the *Odyssey* 'both undergo developments which bring them closer to the world of the audience' (122).

And he himself (Posidonius) shows that the affections arise from spirit and appetite, and he provides the reason why they subside in time, even though a person persist in the opinion and judgements that something bad exists or has arisen for him. In support of this point he even calls as a witness Chrysippus himself, who writes as follows in his second book of his work *On the Passions*: 'In the case of grief also there are some who appear similarly to take leave of it as though sated. Thus the poet speaks in this way about Achilles grieving for Patroclus:

But when he had his fill of weeping and rolling on the ground,
and the longing for such things had gone from his mind and limbs,

he undertook to comfort Priam by setting before him the irrationality of his grief.' Then he adds also the following: 'according to this account, one would not give up the hope that with the passage of time, and when the inflammation of the passion has abated, reason creeping in, and making space, as it were, would present the irrationality of the passion.'

Although Posidonius' comments, as paraphrased by Galen, may suggest that Chrysippus' unified psychological model cannot explain the fact that Achilles' grief could abate while a judgement 'Patroclus' death is bad' persists, in fact the abatement can be explained as a cognitive shift, without reference to a truly irrational and non-cognitive psychic capacity. For one Stoic definition of grief is: 'a fresh opinion of a present evil about which it seems appropriate to feel depression and shrinking of the soul' (Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.14).¹⁷ Achilles can hold both (a) the death of Patroclus is a bad thing, and (b) one should not be, at this time, upset about the death of Patroclus (because such grief is useless). Furthermore, according to Cicero (*Tusc.* 3.76 ff.), Chrysippus' strategy in curing the passions of others was to encourage them to adopt judgements of type (b) rather than type (a), exactly as Achilles seems to do with Priam.¹⁸

Most interesting, however, is how Chrysippus quotes selectively from and alters in his paraphrase the Homeric text. Firstly, note that all manuscripts of the *Iliad* read at 24.513 *αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ῥα γόοιο τετάρπετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς*. Chrysippus' version of the line is not attested elsewhere, although it resembles *Odyssey* 4.541 and 10.499.¹⁹ One cannot rule out the possibility that the quotation of 513 has been garbled in transmission from Chrysippus to Posidonius to Galen, but it seems most plausible that Chrysippus' version is an example of the 'multiformity' of a rhapsodic

¹⁶ This line is athetized by Aristarchus (A scholia) and Dionysius Thrax (T scholia); see H. Erbse (n. 13), 605. Aristarchus comments that the line is unnecessary, and cannot be right because *γυῖα* refers only to the hands and feet and not to the limbs in general. Both these reasons seem odd. Homeric poetry is full of redundancy and pleonasm, and *γυῖα* often seems to have a reference wider than Aristarchus believes (see *Od.* 10.361–3, 18.236). Francesca Schironi has suggested to me that Aristarchus' view may be based on his understanding of the epithet *ἀμφιγύοισιν* (*Iliad* 13.147) as meaning 'ambidexterous'. Dionysius Thrax echoes Aristarchus, but adds that longing and grief can 'only be felt in the soul'. However, this is manifestly untrue for the Stoics who take the soul to be constituted by material *πνεῦμα* which stretches throughout the body.

¹⁷ Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.14: *aegritudo est ergo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur*. The adjective *recens* is a translation of the Greek *πρόσφατος* (see Stob. 2.89.2–3). On the abatement of passion as a cognitive shift and on the disputed interpretations of 'freshness', see A. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa* (Stuttgart, 1890), 269–70; B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford, 1985), 143–55; M. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton, 1994), 381–6; ead., *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001), chapter 1, and Graver (n. 6), 117–20.

¹⁸ On Cicero's appropriation of Chrysippus' therapeutic method, see S. White 'Cicero and the Therapists' in J.G.F. Powell (ed.), *Cicero the Philosopher* (Oxford, 1995), 219–46, Reydam-Schils (n. 10), 134–5, and Graver (n. 6), 121–3 and 203–14.

¹⁹ See N. Richardson, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. 6, Books 21–4, G.S. Kirk general editor, (Cambridge, 1993), 328.

tradition.²⁰ Moreover, it is not necessarily that Chrysippus is reporting the only version of the line that he knew, or the version that happened to spring to mind. Rather he may be selecting carefully between alternatives.²¹ In 513 the verb ἐκορέσθη (had his fill), rather than τετάρπετο (had full enjoyment of) is a judicious choice on his part. For Chrysippus wants to illustrate the general point that we can become filled up, as it were, (ὡς ἂν ἐμπλησθέντες) with passion, at which point the passion subsides. Furthermore, although Chrysippus seems to have quoted some passages where poets allude to the joy of grief,²² he may have thought it inappropriate for the best of the Achaeans to be portrayed indulging in the pleasures of grief, since his focus is not Achilles' indulgence in, but rather recovery from, his emotion.²³

Chrysippus' paraphrase of Homer's text is also worthy of note. While Homer speaks at *Iliad* 24.516 of Achilles 'pitying' (οἰκτείρων) Priam, as he begins his consolatory speech, Chrysippus omits the term pity and says instead that Achilles 'undertook to comfort' (παρακαλεῖν) him, a far less emotionally charged phrase. Clearly the term pity here is inappropriate as, according to the Stoics, it is a type of passion, a species of the genus grief (Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.16). Chrysippus is anxious to present a Homeric Achilles engaging in rational compassion and exhortation, having recovered from his own grief, rather than one wallowing in pity of self or others.

Chrysippus' motif of Achilles as therapist is echoed in the Homeric scholia at a rather unexpected juncture. At *Iliad* 24.560–70 Achilles' attitude to Priam apparently changes from one of consolation and empathy to a flash of hostility. At 568–70

²⁰ See G. Nagy, 'Homeric poetry and problems of multiformity: the 'Panathenaic Bottleneck', *CP* 96 (2001), 109–19. Note that Chrysippus ante-dates Aristarchus by a couple of generations, and thus is working before the period when the Homeric texts become rigid 'scripture', according to Nagy's evolutionary scheme. Thanks to Tim Power for discussion of these issues.

²¹ We know that Chrysippus' work extended to poetic criticism. Diogenes Laertius (7.200) reports two titles of works on poetry, 'On the right way of listening to poetry' and 'On Poems'. A Chrysippus is mentioned by name eight times in the Homeric scholia. Of these eight occurrences, two mention 'Chrysippus the Stoic' (see *SVF* 3, appendix 1, 192–3). We cannot assume, however, that all references in the scholia merely to Chrysippus are references to the Stoic, since we know of three physicians (Diogenes Laertius 7.186) and one grammarian (Scholia in Pindari, *Nem.* 1.49) with that name. Thanks to Tad Brennan for bringing the existence of the grammarian to my attention.

²² See Galen *PHP* 4.7.31, where the phenomena of pleasure in and longing for grief are clear in Chrysippus' quotations of Homer *Od.* 4.113 and Euripides *Electra* 125–6.

²³ Irrespective of what Chrysippus may have thought appropriate to Achilles' character, one might also worry that a text that includes terms for enjoyment of or pleasure in grief causes problems for Chrysippus' theory of passions, which is based on a strict taxonomy of four genera: fear (φόβος, *metus*), appetite (ἐπιθυμία, *libido*), pain (λύπη, *aegritudo*) and pleasure (ἡδονή, *laetitia*). See the testimony in *SVF* 3.377–420, and the discussion of Brennan (n. 4). It is not clear that the Stoics ever discussed the phenomenon of taking pleasure in grief. A grieving agent could take pleasure in grief, in Stoic terms, if he or she holds simultaneously the two following 'fresh' (see n. 17) opinions: (a) 'the death of x is a bad thing', and (b) 'grief is a good thing'. While (a) constitutes the cognitive aspect of grief itself, (b) constitutes the cognitive aspect of pleasure in grief. If grief is a contraction of psychic πνεῦμα, and pleasure is an expansion (see n. 24 below), then taking pleasure in grief involves simultaneous contraction and expansion of the soul. However, as Tad Brennan reminds me, expansions and contractions can be 'swift, alternating, pulsatile, and complex' (personal communication). Note, however, that in Seneca *Ep.* 99.25–30 the author argues against the position of the Epicurean Metrodorus, who holds that there is a pleasure akin to sadness, a pleasure which the grief-stricken can and should enjoy. This implies that the Stoic position is that strictly speaking there is no pleasure in grieving, and Chrysippus surely thought that the poets' talk of the pleasure and joy of grief is simply equivalent to being overcome or carried away by πάθος. Thanks to Charles Brittain for bringing the critique of Metrodorus in Seneca *Ep.* 99 to my attention, and to Margaret Graver for very helpful discussion.

Achilles warns Priam not to stir up his θυμός, lest he may not let him go, disobeying the orders of the god by harming him. This rekindling of anger seems both psychologically plausible and consistent with the Stoic theory of passions. Achilles, still shaken by Patroclus' death, vacillates, as we might expect, between grief, rational judgement and a lingering anger at seeing the father of Hector. For the Stoics, the soul infected by passions undergoes rather dramatic cognitive shifts, and can very literally expand and contract from moment to moment.²⁴ There was some ancient debate, however, as to how to interpret Achilles' threat, as the scholiast on 569 reports:

Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὸ ἦθος Ἀχιλλέως. Οἱ δὲ ὡς ἀποστήσαι τοῦ οἴκτου τῇ καταπλήξει αὐτὸν θέλει, μὴ ἰδὼν Ἑκτορα θρηνήσῃ ἀκωλύτως καὶ ταραξῇ αὐτόν.
(T scholia, Erbse [n. 13], 614)

Aristotle says that the character of Achilles is inconsistent. But others say that he wishes to get rid of his (i.e. Priam's) grief by terrifying him, lest when he (i.e. Priam) sees Hector he mourn uncontrollably and send him (i.e. Achilles) into a state of confusion.

This comment seems to pick up on the preceding T and b scholia on 559, where Achilles, 'looking from under the brows' (ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν) at Priam, begins to speak. The scholiasts gloss this line as 'he becomes savage' (ἀγριαίνεται), adding that Achilles may be worried that Priam, on seeing the mutilated body of Hector, may begin mourning again and stir up (ταράξῃ) Achilles.²⁵

However, note that the scholiast's comment on 569 about the nameless 'others', who think that Achilles is trying to quell a resurgence of Priam's grief, does not mention any anger or savagery on Achilles' part when he *makes* the threat. In fact, the comment on 569 is consistent with Chrysippus' reading of Achilles earlier in Book 24. Achilles' threat to lay hands on Priam does not have to be interpreted as a symptom of anger but rather a rational, if extreme, means of preventing a further outburst of grief that could afflict both men, causing a renewal of grief and anger in both of them.²⁶ A Stoic like Chrysippus could interpret 'looking from under the brows'

²⁴ Diogenes Laertius in his doxography of Stoic ethics describes the effects of the passion on the soul in vivid affective terms (7.112 ff.). Vexation is grief which weighs us down (βαρύνουσιν), annoyance is grief which coops us up and confines us (στενοχωροῦσιν καὶ δυσχωρίαν παρασκευάζουσιν). Similarly want (σπάνις) is a type of appetite that is cut off from its objects, but is still stretched towards it, and attracted to it in vain (τεταμένη δὲ διακενῆς ἐπ' αὐτὸ καὶ σπωμένη). The result of being affected in this way is that we are hindered from seeing the situation as a whole, and from acting rationally. The language in this passage is, for the most part, not metaphorical but literal. Grief and fear are literal contractions of the soul's πνεῦμα, and appetite and joy are literal expansions. Rational impulses are those which do not run out of control, and when these occur, the soul is neither stretched nor contracted in such a way that the proper activity of the soul is impeded. To use an analogy from modern science, just as a spring, according to Hooke's Law, when stretched past its elastic limit to enter the plastic phase loses its power to function reliably as a spring, so the soul when stretched too far loses its ability to act rationally (and similarly when it is cramped). The soul affected by a πάθος will either persist in its impulse, or fluctuate unpredictably, like the spring in its plastic phase. The Stoics themselves describe the psychic condition of the ignorant and vicious as 'fluttering' (πτοιώδη, Stob. 2.68.18 = SVF 3.663).

²⁵ ἀγριαίνεται, ὅτι νῦν αὐτὸν θέλει λαβεῖν, ὃ δὲ θεραπεῦσαι τὰ αἰκίσματα βούλεται, μὴ εἰς θρήνον ἐλθὼν Πρίαμος ταραξῇ αὐτόν. ἢ ὅτι ὑπομνησκει αὐτὸν συνεχῶς Ἑκτορος καὶ τῆς ἔχθρας αὐτοῦ (T scholia).

ἀγριαίνεται, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὰς αἰκίας εἰς θρήνον ἐλθὼν ὁ Πρίαμος ταραξῇ αὐτόν. Καὶ ὅτι συνεχῶς τοῦ δνόματος Ἑκτορος ἐμέμνητο (b scholia, Erbse [n. 13], 613).

²⁶ The text of *Iliad* 24.583–6 seems to support this reading. Achilles carries the body out of Priam's sight so that his heart will not be stirred up in anger, and thus neither will Achilles' own.

(ὕπόδρα ἰδών) at 559, simply as looking ‘sternly’ and not ‘angrily’.²⁷ This apparent moment of anger becomes on this interpretation simply a stern warning to Priam against πάθος. I suggest that some or all of the ‘others’ mentioned by the scholiast commenting on 569 may be Stoics, exploiting Chrysippus’ reading of Achilles as therapist who is all too aware of his own potential for grief and anger, but who is seeking to avoid these passions, rather than to indulge in them.²⁸

Achilles is not of course presented by Chrysippus as a Stoic Sage. Indeed his judgement ‘sooner would you suffer another bad thing’ (*Iliad* 24.551) shows that in Stoic terms he is still vicious and ignorant. Death and loss are not truly bad, but only dispreferred (ἀποπροηγμένα) according to Stoic axiology. But although Achilles counts as vicious according to the Stoics (since they do not, of course, believe in degrees of virtue or vice), as a non-virtuous agent he is still able, according to their view, to perform appropriate actions (καθήκοντα).²⁹ His exhortations to Priam that nothing is to be gained from grief and that he cannot bring Hector back by grieving, are all consistent with Chrysippus’ therapeutics and with early Stoic ethics more generally. The twists and turns of life are out of our control. Our passions can neither change the past, nor prevent future misfortune. Both Homer’s Achilles and the Stoics can agree with these simple propositions. Achilles sees the fortunes of humans as in the hands of Zeus, as his famous comment at *Iliad* 24.527–32 shows, and so, in a different yet analogous way, do the Stoics.³⁰

Allusions to Homer’s Achilles in ancient philosophical texts are always multi-layered and more complex than they first appear. Philosophers tend to approach

The lion simile at 24.572 may suggest that Achilles is actually angry at the time of making the threat, but could also suggest his wrathful potential. However, Achilles’ remarkable treatment of Hector’s body shows that he is still concerned to treat his former enemies with dignity and respect. As Richardson (n. 19, 337) comments, ‘these preparations would normally be undertaken by a family member and it is highly significant that they should be undertaken by Achilles. The washing and anointing were strictly speaking unnecessary since the gods had kept the body fresh and clean, and Aphrodite had herself anointed it with ambrosial oil ... The poet’s careful detailing of this ritual must be designed to stress the propriety with which Achilles now treats the body of his formal enemy’.

²⁷ The phrase ‘looking under the brows’ is in fact ambiguous in that it can connote both a stern expression that precedes a vehement rebuke, though not one expressing uncontrolled anger (*Il.* 4.411, 5.251, 12.230, 18.284), and an extremely angry frame of mind (*Il.* 20.428, 22.260, 22.344, where Achilles looks at and addresses Hector on the battlefield). The expression at 24.559 can exploit these ambiguities. We are reminded of Achilles’ murderous rage, but in the context Achilles’ gaze seems stern rather than angry. Note that Stoic therapists often adopt a stern and hectoring tone. Seneca *Ep.* 99 is paradigmatic.

²⁸ Achilles’ care for his own soul, character and actions at this point – he is concerned lest Priam may stir him up – looks like a very enlightened form of self-interest. But this enlightened self-interest is consistent with care for Priam and Hector (see n. 26 above), and Achilles’ words to Priam are based, as was his earlier speech, on the interests that they share. A renewal of anger and grief on the part of Achilles or Priam will be destructive to both. Even at the moment of threat, there is still identification between the two men (see n. 12 above).

²⁹ On appropriate actions (or ‘proper functions’ as *LS* translate *καθήκοντα*) in Stoicism, and how they are conceptually distinguished from the right actions (*κατορθώματα*) of the Sage, see *LS* 59A–Q, and D. Sedley ‘The Stoic-Platonist debate on *kathekonta*’, in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), *Topics in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford, 1999), 128–52.

³⁰ The will of Homer’s Zeus is sometimes distinguished from the more impersonal dictates of fate or destiny (e.g. when Zeus weighs individuals’ destinies on scales *Iliad* 8.69, 22.209). For the Stoics ‘Zeus’ names the active, rational principle governing the cosmos, and is often synonymous with Nature or fate (see Diogenes Laertius 7.135–6). On the difficulties of reconciling Stoic determinism with individual freedom and responsibility, see S. Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford, 1998).

Achilles from a variety of different perspectives, glorifying some aspects of the hero, while denigrating others. Plato both castigates Achilles in the *Republic*, and uses him as a figure with whom Socrates compares himself in the *Apology* and *Crito*.³¹ Achilles can hardly be an ethical exemplar for Aristotle, who in his *Ethics* considers anger that lasts too long and is too bitter vicious (*Eth. Nic.* 1126a18–20).³² But *An. Post.* 97b15–25 suggests that Aristotle sees some parallels between Achilles and Socrates,³³ and *Poetics* Chapter 2 suggests that Achilles *qua* epic protagonist is in some sense a good man. In general, ancient philosophers tend to distance some aspects of Achilles from their ethical idealizations, while appropriating and reformulating other aspects for their own purposes. The Stoics turn out to be no exception. Like Medea, Achilles is a paradigm of *πάθος*. But unlike Medea, Achilles undergoes a recovery, which although surely temporary, shows the capacity of reason even in the most passionate, not only to diagnose but also to begin to heal the soul of the self and others.

In the last twenty years or so the Stoics' responses to the poetic and mythological tradition have been shown to be far more interesting and nuanced than was once thought.³⁴ Nussbaum is in one sense entirely correct when she concludes that the Stoics are incapable of seeing poetry as 'not just about diseases, but about full health, not just about aberration, but about complete human life'.³⁵ But we should add an optimistic addendum to Nussbaum's verdict on Stoic views of poetry. From a Stoic perspective, if even the most passionate of heroes, Achilles, is capable of consolation,

³¹ See *Apology* 28b, *Crito* 44a5–b2. Also significant are the arguments about the virtues of the Homeric heroes in *Hippias Major* and *Hippias Minor*. For a holistic consideration of these texts see T. Irwin, 'Socrates and the Tragic Hero', in P. Pucci (ed.), *Language and the Tragic Hero. Essays in Honor of Gordon M. Kirkwood* (Atlanta, 1988), 55–84, and see Hobbs (n. 1), 178–98.

³² Note also the scholiast's comment on *Iliad* 24.569 (see p. 11 above), which suggests that Aristotle viewed Achilles' threat to Priam as evidence of an inconsistent character. Such inconsistency, however, is likely to be in Aristotle's eyes a case of poor characterization on the part of the poet. See *Poetics* 1454a26–8, where Aristotle does, however, suggest that inconsistency is pardonable if the character is consistently inconsistent.

³³ The difficult *An. Post.* passage sets up an *aporia* which Aristotle does not solve. The philosopher argues that if we want to figure out whether *μεγαλοψυχία* is one thing or two, we must look at two apparently distinct groups of great-souled individuals to see if they have anything in common: Ajax, Alcibiades and Achilles are great-souled in that they are unable to endure dishonour, while Socrates and Lysander are great-souled in that they are indifferent to fortune, good and bad. The superficial contrast between Achilles and Socrates may suggest two different conceptions of *μεγαλοψυχία*, one honour-loving the other honour-indifferent (see R.A. Gauthier, *Magnanimité. L'idéal de la Grandeur dans la Philosophie païenne et dans la Théologie chrétienne* [Paris, 1951], 56–64). However, Aristotle is surely pointing here to an endoxic, unified conception of *μεγαλοψυχία* as a dignity and self-respect which entails integrity and loyalty to one's conception of the honourable (whatever that conception may be). See C. Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy* (Oxford, 1996), 318, n. 306, and M. Pakaluk, 'The meaning of Aristotelian *megalopsychia*', *OSAP* 26 (2004), 241–75, at 269–70.

³⁴ The once commonly endorsed thesis that the Stoics engaged primarily in allegorical interpretations of poetry has been thoroughly refuted by A.A. Long, 'Stoic readings of Homer', in R. Lamberton and J. Keaney (edd.), *Homer's Ancient Readers* (Princeton, 1992), 41–66. I follow Long here in reading Chrysippus' strategy as one of interpretation, which shows that the Homeric text is a repository of common and reliable opinions that are consistent with Stoic doctrines. This is to be distinguished from allegorical readings, which seek to uncover a recondite and esoteric meaning. Chrysippus' interpretations of poetry are explored by J. Pigeaud, *La Maladie d'âme* (Paris, 1981), 375–407, Gill (n. 2), and Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul* (n. 5), 219–48.

³⁵ M. Nussbaum, 'Poetry and the passions: two Stoic views', in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum (edd.), *Passions and Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, 1993), 97–149, at 148–9.

therapy and *oikeiôsis*, then poetry provides hope that the rest of us may progress ethically and become psychologically healthier. Furthermore, the testimony of Galen and of the Homeric scholia suggests that Chrysippus was but one player in a lively ancient debate about how to read the remarkable events of *Iliad* 24.

Thw Andrew W. Mellon Foundation

HELEN CULLYER
hc@mellon.org